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of Buddha-nature, along with his radical new notion that nonsentient objects 
possess Buddha-nature.
Unfortunately, Liu does not provide an adequate discussion of the histori­
cal context in which Chi-tsang’s thought developed. This is regrettable, since 
it obscures some important issues related to the rise of Chi-tsang’s system to 
the position of San-lun orthodoxy. Despite the impression that Liu seeks to 
give, Chinese Madhyamika did not develop in a single, uncomplicated line 
from Seng-chao to Chi-tsang. As Hirai points out in the book mentioned 
above, from the time of Seng-ch’iian (n.d.), two generations before Chi- 
tsang, there existed two groups within the Chinese Madhyamika lineage. One 
group devoted themselves primarily to doctrinal studies, while the other 
stressed the importance of meditation. Chi-tsang belonged to the first group. 
The rise of Chi-tsang’s philosophy to the position of orthodoxy represents the 
victory of his brand of Sinitic Madhyamika over the other, more praxis-orient­
ed lineage. Since this had an incalculable impact on the subsequent develop­
ment of this sect, lack of attention to this point is a serious defect in any work 
on Chi-tsang’s thought. Moreover, the rise of Chi-tsang’s system to ortho­
doxy is no doubt intimately related to the close relationship he enjoyed with 
the Sui court. A closer look at the specific moves through which Chi-tsang 
sought to establish his system as the normative one for the San-lun sect would 
have immeasurably enhanced the value of this book.
In conclusion, it may be said that although this volume contains a reliable 
guide to the main points of Chi-tsang’s Madhyamika philosophy, it is far 
from being the definitive work on “ Madhyamaka Thought in China.”
RELIGIOUS PLU RALISM  AN D  CHRISTIAN TRUTH. By Joseph 
Stephen O’Leary. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996, xiii 
+  269 pp.
David R. Loy
Bunkyo University
All religious thinking today faces the same double challenge: postmoder­
nism and pluralism. Deconstruction especially cannot be ignored, for it has 
achieved important insights into how all language, including religious dis­
course, means; and the global encounter of religions with each other con­
stitutes a serious challenge to their incommensurable truth claims. The danger 
with the first is the kind of nihilistic “ atheology” that throws out baby with
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bathwater by denying all religious truths and, with the second, a superficial 
relativism that cheapens the importance of such claims. These challenges are 
more problematical for Christianity than Buddhism, since its greater emphasis 
on salvation through belief leaves it more vulnerable to deconstructive cri­
tiques of those beliefs, and its universalistic ambitions contrast more sharply 
with the uniqueness it attributes to the role of Jesus.
How can the Christian message be understood today, stripped of outdated 
dogmas and revitalized by its dialogue with other religions? I know of no 
other book that responds to these challenges as well as Religious Pluralism 
and Christian Truth. O’Leary has thoroughly digested the implications of 
deconstructive (and analytic) philosophy and knows that one cannot just cut 
away the Gordian knot of theology but must delicately address its claims, 
piece by piece, to recover the salvific phenomenology that dogma now ob­
scures. To help with that process, he engages in dialogue with Buddhism, espe­
cially Nagarjuna, whose Madhyamika offers an alternative deconstruction of 
truth claims in service of spiritual experience.
The preface offers three imperatives for theology today. Theology must be 
phenomenological, constantly soliciting metaphysical claims, for metaphysics 
cannot be overcome once and for all. It must be pluralistic, for pluralism 
today is an irreducible aspect of religious life and thought that can never be 
resolved in the final triumph of a single standpoint. O’Leary pictures religions 
as all “ products of finite, historical, situation-bound struggles, each of which 
projects images and a rhetoric of the transcendent, and develops these in a con­
stant ferment of self-deconstruction” (x). The antidote to relativism is found 
not in a retreat from this engagement but in those relations themselves. Fi­
nally, theology must be rational in the wide sense, referring objectively to 
truth or truths even though this truth can no longer be formulated indepen­
dently of the interplay between different religious discourses (such as that be­
tween Christianity and Buddhism).
Emphasizing that there is no neutral viewpoint which transcends or 
balances different religions, Religious Pluralism and Christian Truth is a 
Western Christian attempt to clarify the conditions under which theological 
thinking can be pursued today. Like every religious message which has to 
“ pay the price of its existence” (Hocking) and cannot surpass the conditions 
of its own historical contingency, the price of O’Leary’s perspective for the 
Buddhist-Christian dialogue is that he is less sensitive to some of the historical 
developments in the Buddhist tradition. So he tends, like I often do, to assume 
that Nagarjuna had the last word on sunyata and the two truths, without con­
sidering the historical disagreements, explicit and implicit, that have occurred 
(and still recur) over their meaning. Thus this book is better at using the 
resources of the Buddhist tradition for demonstrating how Christian theology
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must change, than it is at elucidating the dialectics at work in the historical de­
velopment of Buddhist theology.
Looking at it from the other side, however, perhaps Buddhist thinkers can 
learn from this book the importance of conducting similar deconstructions of 
Buddhist doctrine. Lacking a Vatican, we find it easier to ignore what we find 
uncomfortable in the tradition, but then we end up with a diminished tradi­
tion. For example, how literally should karma and rebirth be understood? 
And no one wants to address the awkward fact that the Ch’an/Zen under­
standing of enlightenment is very different and probably incommensurable 
with Pali accounts of what Sakyamuni realized under the Bodhi tree.
Chapter one, “ Interreligious Space,” offers an overview of O’Leary’s desire 
to accept the historical relativization of all religious discourse while still affirm­
ing the referential objectivity of dogmatic language. “ God” is a cipher for the 
whole history of the construction and deconstruction of monotheism, and Je­
sus Christ is disseminated across history, his identity constructed by us and 
subject to profound alterations from new encounters such as the dialogue with 
Buddhism. The parity of religions is a surface manifestation of the finite sta­
tus all religions share: their contingent and incomplete character as historical­
ly developing identities. Religions refuse to see the real conditions of their exis­
tence because they transfer to their language, representations and history the 
ultimacy that actually applies only to the ultimate reality they serve witness to. 
In other words, they fall into self-idolatry.
O’Leary has no time for an Eliade-type unitary theology of the sacred that 
overrides the diversity of historical phenomena, for that loses the anchorage 
of religions in believing engagement, the very thing that makes their words 
real for those who live in them. The striking convergences that sometimes oc­
cur do not point to any uniformity. Rather, it is their “ rough similarity as ex­
istential projects which unites the varied spiritual trajectories of humanity” 
(21). (I would add that Buddhism and Christianity are further distinguished 
by their preoccupation with the liminal experiences of suffering and death.) 
O’Leary also criticizes attempts to extract a common mystical depth-dimen­
sion, in a way that challenges our usual ways of understanding enlightenment: 
“ The search for pure immediacy ends up clutching the wraith of an ephemeral 
sensation” (31). The presence of the spirit is not the foundation for such a 
metaphysics of presence but arises as an unpredictable spontaneity making all 
closure impossible.
Chapter two, “ Dissemination,” is a sophisticated application of Derridean 
insights to theological language. Because there is a necessary core of blindness 
to our usage of any concept, which no amount of clarification can completely 
eliminate, religious understanding too consists in a process of constant transla­
tion which never comes to a halt in the finally correct language. Thus religions
302
BOOK R EV IEW S
are metaphorical constructs, although usually unaware of “ the repressed fluid­
ity of the imaginings they have canonised” (44). There are no statements 
about God that are true once and for all, for “ God” lends itself to an endless 
slippage of meaning in successive contexts.
Theology cannot remedy this brokenness of scripture by thinking-back to 
the pure Word-event of revelation. Its only recourse is to accept its finitude 
and live that disseminated condition. The biblical world is historically and 
culturally remote from us; we are exiled from it. The Bible unsettles us not by 
imposing some univocal meaning or moral demand on our lives, “ but by un­
foreseen solicitations which make of our belonging to it a dangerous adven­
ture. Instead of giving us a meaning it disseminates us” (52). The Incarnation 
appears as a series of unpredictable breakthroughs of the transcendent in 
everyday life, which oppose the grip of a totalizing logos. If the biblical stress 
is on laying down one’s life, “ it is so that life can be lived as a death to self at 
every moment, whereas the cult of a full, immutable, unified, originary life, in 
its denial or mortality, turns out by its abstraction to represent a grip of death 
on life” (65). A deconstructed Christianity begins to look quite Buddhist, but 
it is not so simple, as we shall see.
Chapter three, “ Relative Truth,” argues for what it terms “ situated objec­
tivity.” The fact that reason is always historicized—the product of a particu­
lar history which it can never master—means that all we can ever have is a per- 
spectivist account of religious discourse, a more or less “ skillful means” for 
designating what always surpasses it. For O’Leary this does not contradict the 
objective referentiality of religious propositions, but merely underlines the 
situation-bound character of this objectivity. Just as scientific theories are 
confirmed by the facts they permit us to observe, so religious visions are 
confirmed by the experiences they make possible. “ Every perspective is in it­
self a distortion, but the truth emerges only in perspective” (78). Speculative 
theology, insofar as it tries to “ stop up these holes” in religious language, 
ends up blocking out transcendence. All revelation too is mediated by interpre­
tation, which is why there are no “ naked core events” (such as miracles or 
prophets’ encounters with God) recoverable independently of the way the tra­
dition has understood them. Even “ Christ is risen” is not the simple descrip­
tion of a visible miracle but one of several ways to interpret the experience of 
the earliest Christians after Jesus’ death. It summarizes a cluster of interpreta­
tions in tension with each other, and remains open to reinterpretation. From a 
pragmatic perspective, religions are “ true” only if they can be lived as libera- 
tive under particular cultural and political circumstances. As these circum­
stances are changing all the time, so must our interpretations.
A religious system is but a makeshift net trawled in the sea of
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spiritual reality; yet insofar as it is pervaded by the vibrations of the 
reality it envisages and glimpses, one can trust such a system, and 
dwell in it not only affectively but intellectually. We have no other ac­
cess to religious reality than what these fragile and contingent sys­
tems offer. A thinking that bypasses them, on the basis of some origi­
nal spiritual breakthrough, cannot claim to have an objectivity they 
lack; at best such thinking may in its turn found a tradition, which 
will be subject to the same conditions. (95-96)
Chapter four, “ Derrida on Truth,” criticizes Derrida in an attempt to sal­
vage an objective truth from the unstable disseminations of textuality. Accord­
ing to O’Leary, Derrida glosses over what is crucial to the philosophical tradi­
tion: the importance of the act o f  judgement in affirming propositional truth. 
This chapter is more strained and, from a Buddhist perspective, probably un­
necessary. The need to rescue the relationship between a proposition and 
‘ ‘what is the case’ ’ may be more important for a religious tradition that empha­
sizes the salvific role of faith in that truth. Buddhism, however, can accept the 
relativity of truth more easily, because ultimately the issue is the performative, 
i.e. liberative, role of such truth claims. Instead of truth as correspondence, 
we can understand it as skillful means. Then historically contingent truth can 
be truth, because liberative for a particular historically contingent people, 
without concern for its objectivity. It is enough that such a religious truth re­
veals to us that we must change and how we can do so.
It is also important for us to realize that there is no escape from such truths: 
we may reject “ religious” ones in favor of more “ secular” ones but our lives 
gain their meaning as we learn to navigate according to one or another star. 
Then the issue becomes the kind of transformations that different contingent 
truths encourage and assist. In the end, perhaps the value of religious truths is 
due to the fact that the transformations they enable are superior to the trans­
formations encouraged by idolatries that worship money, fame, power, etc.
Despite its concern to preserve a core of truth immune to context and relativ­
ity, there is much in this chapter too which resonates with Buddhism. “ We 
seek a spiritual truth hidden behind the plurality of the biblical gestures, not 
seeing that it’s in these gestures themselves that truth happens. . . . One might 
see the language of Scripture more as a strategic writing aimed to free us from 
illusions and fixations than the direct transmission of a concrete message; as 
an ensemble of language games to be practised, not in the confidence of utter­
ing truth, but in an effort to maintain the demystificatory force of this mature 
and subtle language without falling back into the platitudes of a less refined 
one” (120).
Following on the deconstruction of theological language in the first half of
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the book, chapter five “ Emptiness and the Two Truths” explicitly brings in a 
Buddhist perspective, with emphasis on Nagarjuna’s deployment of sunyata. 
Understandably, O’Leary is not as much at home here as in Christian theolo­
gy, and his use of sunyata reproduces the tensions that infect many Buddhist 
applications of the concept. On the one hand we are told that ultimate reality 
is fully attained only in liberation from all conditioned thought (132), but we 
also read that even ultimate reality is merely a label of conventional thought, 
for nirvana itself is empty (139). In the latter case the final dualism, between 
relative and ultimate, also collapses, but this chapter, like most Buddhist writ­
ings on the topic, attempts to preserve a non-conceptual transcendence re­
vealed at enlightenment. Although sQnyafn-language works against itself to 
foreclose all reference to an ultimate reality transcending this one, O’Leary 
uses it to clear the ground for the irruption of transcendence.
The dualism that results from this, between language and that-which-tran- 
scends-language, has had a long and problematic history within Mahayana 
thought. Dogen’s philosophy, in particular, can be seen as a response that at­
tempts to overcome this dualism because of problems that by his time had 
become apparent—such as that between means and ends. For Dogen, words 
and metaphors can be understood not just as instrumentally trying to grasp 
and convey truth (and thereby dualistically interfering with our realization of 
some truth that transcends words) but as being the truth, because one of the 
many ways that Buddha-nature is. This is not the place to elaborate on that 
history, nor can we fault O’Leary for reproducing tensions within Buddhist 
thought; what this problem means, again, is that perhaps we Buddhist schol­
ars need to do for the Buddhist tradition what this book does for the Chris­
tian.
Chapter six, “ God Deconstructs,” focuses on the meaning of “ God.” Lan­
guage about God must be rightly directed if it is to refer to its object, and this 
involves the way of life and long tradition which lies behind the use of God­
language. No divine name can fix the identity of God; naming is always con­
text- and culture-bound (which is why Jesus calling God Abba “ Father” may 
have been a breakthrough in his time but is too patriarchal for ours). Only the 
history of its usage gives the word “ God” any concrete sense now. In short, 
God too is a construction and the more we labor on this construction, trying 
to stabilize it, the more it wobbles—a law figured in the tower of Babel. We ap­
prehend the divine not by totalizing it but by discovering the impossibility of 
totalization. “ If one uses the name of God in a consciously subversive way, 
leaving it none of the solidarity of a great master-name, if one assumes it as an 
excentric name which no longer furnishes a stable centre to the self that in­
vokes it, but rather dislodges the self from its habitual ruts, then the meaning 
of this God cannot be known in advance” (169). Such a God lacks self-identi-
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ty because its significance is always situational.
The book includes short but incisive critiques of many other thinkers, 
among them Karl Barth, John Hick, Gordon Kaufman, Jean-Luc Marion, 
and even Richard Rorty. One of the sharpest is directed against the Kyoto 
school, especially John Cobb and Masao Abe. O’Leary points to “ a certain 
massiveness” in its thinking about nothing and emptiness, and quotes Jamie 
Hubbard: there is no infinite, functioning emptiness swooshing around the 
universe, relating to dependent beings and thereby validating its own exis­
tence.
To make emptiness a principle of speculative construction is to miss 
its value as a mobile strategy, to be differently applied from case to 
case, as in the Zen koans (194).
The alternative to a metaphysics of being seems to be not a metaphys­
ics of emptiness, but a thinking that is aware of the limits of 
metaphysics, and that deploys such words as ‘being’ and ‘emptiness’ 
adroitly as fragile products of a historical labour of thought, having 
only a provisional usefulness in certain contexts. . . . The notion of 
emptiness serves at the phenomenological level as a therapy against 
metaphysical delusions. But in Abe’s hands it becomes itself a 
metaphysical absolute. This leads to a speculative engagement be­
tween this absolutised emptiness and metaphysical versions of Chris­
tian theology, which themselves need to be overcome by being re­
called to their biblical roots (195).
These few words express my uneasiness about Kyoto school thought better 
than anything else I have seen.
The final chapter, ‘‘The Empty Christ,” addresses what from a Buddhist 
perspective is perhaps the greatest problem with Christianity, the way it 
privileges the role of Jesus as unique and pre-eminent. Hinduism can embrace 
many avatars and there were several Buddhas before Sakyamuni, which seems 
more consistent for teachings that realize they must vary according to circum­
stances. From outside the Christian tradition, it is difficult not to see the em­
phasis on Jesus’s uniqueness as an attachment, perhaps not so different from 
the desire we all have to be special or unique.
This problem is addressed squarely but not resolved. O’Leary admits that, 
the more we open up and listen to what other religions say, the more difficult it 
becomes to claim that God is fully and definitively revealed only in Christ. The 
first section discusses what the divinity of Christ means, and, although the 
vocabulary is very different, the conclusion is perhaps not so incompatible 
with Buddhism. All human beings are called into existence by the Word; Jesus
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corresponded to that divine call into existence, and the call to return to God, 
in so perfect a way that his human life becomes a definitive expression of the 
Word in human and historical terms. . . . But then, one cannot help adding, 
there may well have been, and may yet be, other equally definitive expressions 
of the Word.
O’Leary defends the eschatological primacy of Christ—“ the only event 
within history that can take the measure of history itself” (225)—as based on 
the conjunction between divine transcendence and the human struggle against 
oppression, giving Christianity an “ unsurpassed historical concreteness and es­
chatological reach” (227). His primacy, then, is less a matter of ontological su­
periority than precise, irreplaceable function, which roots Christianity firmly 
in its biblical context as the working of the divine in history. “ If history can be 
redeemed, then Christ alone emerges as the historical saviour” (233).
This may remain less than obvious to those many Buddhists who have taken 
the vow to save all sentient beings. And, as we look back over all the horrors 
of our century, we may wonder what kind of God would allow such a history, 
even what “ the redemption of history” could possibly mean today. Perhaps 
the author was struck by the same thoughts, for the above argument is fol­
lowed by deep reservations about this whole Christological tradition: it is all a 
contingent interpretation, a doctrinal construction subject to possible revolu­
tions in light of new ways of understanding. Here, it seems to me, the book 
falters: O’Leary obviously feels some discomfort with this tradition and is 
searching for an alternative articulation; but for the time being, at least, he 
can do no more than draw attention to its problematic status. Because to do so 
would strike too deeply at the heart of the Christian tradition, which has been 
built too much upon the uniqueness of Christ?
Yet more can be said about the unknown Christ, who emptied himself and 
did not cling to his own identity. For an “ empty Christology” one needs a mid­
dle way between substantialist attachment to traditional conceptions and the 
type of nihilistic critique which robs them of all authority. Christ is not a sub­
stance to be defined but an event to be interpreted. . . . Then how should we 
understand that event?
The final section addresses John Keenan’s important effort to rethink Christ 
as empty of any essence and fully engaged in the dependently co-arisen world 
in all its radical contingency. The problematical meaning of sunyata not­
withstanding, much can be said in favor of this interpretation. The basic prob­
lem remains, however, that sunyata does not transcend dependently co-arising 
forms in anything like as clear a way as the Christian God transcends crea­
tures. Here the application of Mahayana language becomes problematical, 
stumbling on discords and resistances which cannot be brushed away without 
brushing away too much of the Christian tradition. “ One is constructed on
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the basis of the biblical separation of finite and infinite, the other ignores this 
distinction and bases its economy of meaning on the perception of reality as 
such” (257).
Finally, then, there can be no fusion of horizons between the two traditions. 
Either one becomes translated into the other, as Keenan translates Christiani­
ty into Buddhism, or one accepts their ultimate incommensurability, as O’Lea­
ry does. ‘‘The event of salvation, historical and fleshly, in which we are caught 
up, according to the Gospel, cannot be reabsorbed into any general philosophi­
cal vision, even that of Buddhism” (258). That Zen, for example, makes a 
very similar point does not overcome the difference between two such different 
ways of understanding the world and living in it.
This summary—much of it appropriating O’Leary own words, which I can­
not improve upon—has been able to touch only very briefly on some of the 
many issues addressed. Despite the reservations expressed above, and the addi­
tional reservation that I am not familiar enough with the other literature in 
this field, Religious Pluralism and Christian Truth seems to me an impressive 
accomplishment. It is too much to expect that all future work in Christian the­
ology and Buddhist-Christian dialogue will take account of what this book 
does toward keeping the Christian “ good news” alive. But it should.
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We are very fortunate to have these two translations of this major work 
of Zen literature. Within the Japanese Soto Zen tradition, Keizan’s Denko­
roku is considered second as a text only to Dogen’s Shobogenzo, and it serves 
as a valuable and highly illuminating record of Zen lore and teaching. Some­
times two competent translations of Zen literature are better than one, as com-
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